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"New" Civil Rights
Strategies for
Latino Political
Empowerment
Seth Racusen
Latinos became the largest "minority" group and significantly increased their political
representation in Massachusetts in the past decade. Even with these gains, their political
power is not nearly commensurate with the size of their population. Many aspects of
Latino political demographics, including a large immigrant population with low citizen-
ship rates, high poverty rates, and dispersion across many electoral districts, contribute
to their underrepresentation. The political demographics facing Massachusetts Latinos
have led many analysts to prescribe alternative electoral systems as avenues to achieve
increased political representation. This article reviews the critiques of the 1970s and
1980s civil rights redistricting strategies and explores the prospects that the "new"
1990s strategies could offer Latinos in the six cities where they are highly concentrated
and at the state level. The author projects gains for most legislative bodies, but at a rate
lower than suggested by proportionality advocates.
Latinos became the largest "minority" group and gained a modicum of political repre-
sentation in Massachusetts during the past decade. In contrast to 1983, when there
was only one elected representative, 1 Massachusetts has eight Latino elected officials
and there are prospects for increased representation in several districts. 2 These gains fol-
low the national pattern in which Latino population growth precedes increased political
representation. It has occurred through the creation of Latino majority districts and
"rainbow" districts in which Latinos and other minority groups, usually blacks, have
combined to form political majorities.
Even with these gains, Latino municipal political power is not nearly commensurate
with the size of the Latino population in the cities where Latinos are highly concen-
trated. Their underrepresentation is more marked at the state level, which includes no
Latino elected officials. This also follows national patterns of Latino underrepresentation
in all states except New Mexico. 3 Thus, one prominent analyst has suggested that the
emphasis on litigation and electoral politics may have reached "a point of diminishing
returns without the addition of some new conceptualization, strategies, and approaches
for Latino politics in the 1990's."4
This article examines one facet of such a new conceptualization for litigation and
electoral politics: the potential impact of alternative electoral systems for increased
Latino political representation in Massachusetts. Latino political demographics in
Massachusetts and many other states have led many analysts to prescribe alternative
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"Latino political demographics in Massachusetts and many
other states have led many analysts to prescribe
alternative electoral systems, not based on small geographic
districts, as more fruitful avenues to achieve increased
political representation,... What impact might these alternative
systems have upon the political representation of the
Latino community?"
— Seth Racusen
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electoral systems, not based on small geographical districts, as more fruitful avenues to
achieve increased political representation. The key demographics factors that have
led to these proposals are the residential dispersion of the Latino community in many
municipalities and political districts of an increasingly multiethnic population. However,
advocates for the alternative systems have not addressed the other aspects of the political
demographics of the Latino community. The alternatives are based on premises about
voters in comparison with the district systems structured by population figures. Since
the Latino community has a high percentage of nonvoters, I ask, what impact might
these alternative systems have upon the political representation of the Latino communi-
ty? I outline the critiques of the 1970s and 1980s civil rights strategies, present Latino
political demographics in Massachusetts, and explore the prospective impact of alterna-
tive electoral systems on Massachusetts Latinos.
Critiques of Civil Rights Strategies
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) changed the shape of politics by significantly broadening
the demographic makeup of the electorate, restructuring the rules of the game, and mak-
ing possible the vast increases in Latino and black elected officials. In the three decades
since the passage of the VRA and particularly since the 1974 amendment to include
Latinos, the number of black and Latino elected representatives has increased dramati-
cally. The Latino community saw a threefold increase to more than 4,000 as of 1991. 5
The act attacked outright barriers to participation and replaced at-large districting in
cities and counties with single-member districts in which Latinos, blacks, or some com-
bination could comprise a majority of a new district.
Participation
The participatory focus of civil rights litigation has successfully challenged many barri-
ers to the political participation of blacks, Latinos, and Asians. This has included
efforts to eliminate outright barriers to participation: registration requirements, literacy
tests, poll tax, English-language ballots, and many forms of Election Day intimidation.
Nevertheless, large segments of the Latino community do not vote. More than 5
million Latinos were noncitizens in 1990, the steepest participation obstacle facing the
community. To address this obstacle, there have been calls for naturalization campaigns,
targeted voter registration and mobilization, and including noncitizens in the elect-
orate, particularly for local elections. Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio have pro-
posed allowing noncitizens to vote during the five-year waiting period for naturalization.
Those who participate in municipal elections would become citizens based on their vot-
ing and be exempted from the citizenship examination. DeSipio favors the inclusion
of noncitizens in all elections, while de la Garza favors it only in municipal elections.
Their proposals seek to increase Latino citizenship rates by creating an incentive for
noncitizens to vote. 6
Noncitizen voting, neither mandated nor proscribed by the U.S. Constitution, has
been contingent on state politics. Noncitizens could vote in at least twenty-two
states from the late eighteenth century until 1926, when Arkansas was the last state to
end it. 7 During this period, noncitizen voting, provided as an incentive to stimulate
European immigration and settlement of the frontier, was accompanied by bilingual edu-
cation on the prairies. Today, noncitizen voting is allowed in nine European
163
New England Journal of Public Policy
countries and New Zealand, and in Chicago and New York school board elections;
it has also been approved in Takoma Park, Maryland. 8
Voting eligibility requirements reflect a society's view toward its members. Like all
political rules, those for voting eligibility are changeable. Given the increasingly inter-
national structure of the economy, considerable discussion of new approaches toward
political participation, including the voting rights of noncitizens, is warranted.
Structures ofRepresentation
The second focus of the civil rights strategies being reevaluated has been the right to
cast a meaningful ballot, namely, to enable communities of black, Latino, and Asian
voters to effectively exercise their own preferences. Many litigation suits have concen-
trated on moving from at-large to single-member districting and influencing the shape
of the resulting redistricting boundaries.
The courts have defined civil rights districts as remedies for specific circumstances.
A three-part standard, established in the 1986 case Thornburgh v. Gingles, requires that
a district be created for a protected group, provided that the following conditions are
demonstrated:
• The protected group is sufficiently large and compact to form the majority
of an electoral district.
• That the protected group is politically cohesive.
• That the "majority" must also have been politically cohesive and blocked the pref-
erences of the protected group. 9
It is the first prong of the Gingles test, which has been criticized for denying the rights
of noncompact minorities to cast a meaningful ballot.
District representation has not proved to be the best remedy to increase Latino or
Asian 10 representation, owing to residential dispersion. 11 It was extremely difficult to cre-
ate a municipal-level Latino majority district in Boston in 1983. 12 Where districts can be
constructed, they can effectively provide representation.
District remedies are advantageous to the largest minority group in each municipali-
ty, which has led to concern that groups would have interests in distinctive electoral
districts and structures, creating a structural basis for competing electoral strategies. 13
Blacks in Florida, Latinos and Asians in California, and Asians in New York City redis-
tricting have found their electoral interests conflicting with those of other groups. 14
Because many Latinos have been elected from rainbow districts where blacks comprise
the largest group, these coalitions are viewed as highly strategic for the Latino commu-
nity. For example, former state representative Nelson Merced was elected from a district
estimated to be about one-quarter Latino and almost half black. 15 But there is nothing
automatic about these coalitions, which are so strategic for Latino empowerment. 16
Indeed, one group's gain has come at the expense of another, a dynamic that
becomes increasingly difficult as each group becomes larger. To illustrate these dynam-
ics, consider Pacific City, California, a small city whose population is 30 percent Asian,
10 percent Latino, and 4 percent black and whose school board has nine at-large mem-
bers and oniy one minority member, who is black. A lawsuit of Latinos and blacks
yielded a district plan with two majority-minority districts. Asians, highly dispersed
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within Pacific City, subsequently entered the process, favoring a modified at-large sys-
tem using cumulative voting. In such circumstances, what rights, if any, do noncompact
minorities possess? If none, what democratic principle would one invoke to insist on
geographical compactness? If some, how would the rights of compact and noncompact
minorities be evaluated simultaneously? 17 The complexities are equally difficult in
cities in which two equivalent-size minority groups are competing for political repre-
sentation. 18
There are many examples of the potential contentiousness of current approaches to
resolving competing claims. While a few attorneys and scholars envision solutions
within the context of the Voting Rights Act to the questions about noncompact minori-
ties and competing claims over the shape of districts, 19 many view these issues as neither
foreseen nor adjudicable by the act. Boston's history has demonstrated that it is possible
to create multiethnic redistricting coalitions. Nonetheless, the complexities arising from
multiple voting claims increase in places with larger Latino, black, and Asian communi-
ties.
20 The projected growth of Latino and Asian communities suggests that these com-
plications will increase.
Even where redistricting has produced increased representation, there are concerns
about unintended consequences of the district strategy. Many observers have noted
that the increase in numbers of Latino (and black) elected officials has not contributed to
sustained increased mobilization and participation, part of the original civil rights vision
which led to the VRA. Instead, participation follows a cyclical pattern, initially increas-
ing when a civil rights district is first created, then returning to relatively low participa-
tion rates, largely as a consequence of incumbency. 21
Questions have also been raised about what minority officials can accomplish, given
the shape of U.S. politics. Latino and black elected officials were elected primar-
ily to municipal and state legislative bodies, whose limited power has been eroding. 22
The racial dynamics existing within many of those bodies further limits minority
power. 23 In some instances, new rules have been devised to limit the power of minority
officeholders.
After the first Mexican-American woman was elected to the school board in
a small Texas county, the board changed its rules for putting items on the agenda.
Whereas prior to her election, any one member could put an item on the agenda,
now it would require a second before issues would be considered.24
Berry [an incumbent black city councilor] received the largest number of first-
ballot choices — more than any of the white candidates. It was the tradition
in Cincinnati that the council member with the largest vote would be elected by
the council to serve as mayor . . . After much political maneuvering, the white
council member with the most seniority was chosen mayor. 25
Impeding minority officeholders need not be as explicit as these cases. Instead, the
"pockets" of civil rights structures operate within a majoritarian environment,
which places extreme limits on what can be achieved. The "white backlash" that led to
the California Proposition 13 initiative can be viewed as a majoritarian response to
the California assembly, presided over by the black liberal Speaker Willie Brown, which
was perceived as quite liberal for the decade before the initiative. Bruce Cain argues
that such majoritarian "adjustments" will inevitably limit civil rights efforts. 26
Lani Guinier has advanced the same argument with a different emphasis. In her view,
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such "disproportionate majority power" is fundamentally "unlegitimate" because major-
ity rule has always presumed a "reciprocity claim," which she states as follows:
"While pluralist theories of democracy do contemplate minority losses, they do not nec-
essarily envision a minority that never wins."27
The relationship between majority rule and minority rights was at the center of James
Madison's warnings about the danger of "majority tyranny" and much of the liberal
theory of the eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract was motivat-
ed by concern about how an individual could rationally abide by a majority decision
with which he disagreed, considered a litmus test of the legitimacy of a representative
democracy. According to Rousseau, the majority, if animated by the general will of the
population, would always represent the best decision, which the rational individual
would recognize. Guinier has argued that these theorists presumed that the legitimacy of
majority rule rested with the hope that a loser today could become a winner tomorrow.
The status of a permanent minority, whose interests are consistently outvoted, violates
this reciprocity tenet within majoritarianism. Thus, Guinier has called for a new trade-
off between majority rule and minority rights.
The emerging critique of the civil rights movement points to four principal problems
with single-member voting; (1) the impact of incumbency, which depresses voter
turnout, is particular strong in districts, (2) dispersed minorities will not be compact
enough to compose a district; (3) the difficulties of mediating between the claims of
multiple groups may increase tensions between groups; and (4) minority elected officials
encounter unresponsive white legislators. Many facets of this critique should not be left
at the door of the civil rights movement, but rather be regarded as consequences of the
majoritarian limitations of U.S. political institutions that it did not challenge.
To date, Latino analysts have focused primarily on the limited applicability of the
Voting Rights Act to the specific barriers to the political participation of the Latino com-
munity. One important analyst who has commented on the structural issues views sin-
gle-member districting as the best, although imperfect alternative because it produces
the greatest levels of representation for Latinos and blacks, given contemporary
realities. 28 To address the effects of incumbency on participation, some recommend more
influence districts, in which Latinos are not a majority but a sizable minority, with more
than 20 percent of a district's adult population. According to this view, Latino participa-
tion would increase because multiple candidates would have to compete for their votes,
stimulating mobilization. Latinos would also supposedly be more highly motivated to
participate in influence districts than in safe districts. But influence districts would not
lead to much increased representation. 29 The proposal for influence districts partially
responds to the VRA critique.
However, the critique of majoritarianism has not been substantively addressed by
these analysts. Angelo Falcon, president of the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy in
New York and one of the principal investigators of the important Latino National
Political Study, has criticized Guinier for underestimating the significance between
"community and group solidarity" in politics, and those "linkages between community
and the political system."30 But does group solidarity really emanate from residential
proximity? Guinier argues that interest groups tend to be more mobilized in alternative
systems. Within much important commentary, such as Luis Fraga's thoughtful discus-
sion about the importance of Latino advocacy of an informed public interest, lies an
implicit acceptance of the majoritarian biases of the contemporary allocation of power.
Nonmajoritarian systems offer fairer representational possibilities for dispersed politi-
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cal minorities and eliminate the potentially fractious decentennial redistricting fights.
The allocation of power inherent in redistricting moves from the planning arena to the
electoral arena. Competing claims and demographic changes are mediated through elec-
toral alliances and would not require new district boundaries.
Key to these claims is a presumption that a dispersed minority group would be better
represented under the alternative systems. Much of the increase in minority presence in
cities has been due to the growth of U.S. Asian and Latino communities, both having
low registration and voting rates and facing many participation hurdles. While the alter-
native systems have the potential to provide representation to dispersed groups, those
groups must have sufficient voting power, which has not been clearly established.
Instead, the very groups that would supposedly benefit from the alternative systems par-
ticipate in electoral politics at much lower levels. Lani Guinier, who noted this problem,
argues that nonvoters would still stand to gain from alternative systems because the sys-
tems would mobilize groups, in which they could participate, and create a qualitatively
different environment that would generate more responsive public policy. 31 But would
groups with few voters actually lose representation in a system based on quotas of vot-
ers? If the answer is yes, would this represent a realistic option for Latinos or Asians?
This article reports on one aspect of Guinier's broader proposals: What impact might
alternative electoral systems have upon the representation of a disperse minority group,
Latinos in Massachusetts, which faces many barriers to participation? While much of
her other arguments warrant further examination, the empirical exploration that follows
is an important test for adequate consideration of structural alternatives.
Latino Political Demographics in Massachusetts
Despite its rapid expansion during the 1980s, the Massachusetts Latino electorate
appears less mobilized than that of other large states. From an estimated 19,959 regis-
tered voters in 1982, the Latino electorate grew two and a half times in just eight years
to a total of approximately 48,510 voters in 1990. During this period, the Latino elec-
torate expanded from 0.7 percent to 1.6 percent of the total electorate, (see Table 1)
The Latino electorate would be still larger— approximately 2 percent of the total
Massachusetts electorate— if several methodological problems were corrected. The
figures cited above, based on the U.S. Census Current Population Surveys (CPS) of
1982-1990, underestimate the Massachusetts Latino electorate at any given time
because of the continual undercounting of the Latino population. The 1990 electoral
data projected population estimates and miscalculated Latino adults in the state by
26,374, according to the 1990 census. 32 Second, that census, according to another census
report, undercounted the Latino population by 7.3 percent. 33 The adjusted figures (see
Table 2) project nearly 61,000 registered voters with a turnout of 49,000 in 1990.
When compared with Latino electorates in other states with large Latino populations,
Massachusetts Latinos have been participating at lower rates. Figure 1 presents the reg-
istration rates, the key indicator of participation, for Latinos in the twelve states for
which they are given in the 1988-1992 CPS. The national averages of Latino registra-
tion for these three election years varied between 32 percent and 36 percent. Most of the
larger states were at or above those levels during all three of the election years. Larger,
more densely populated communities tend to be more mobilized because of the structure
of the U.S. political system. California, with the lowest Latino participation rates, and
Massachusetts, with the next lowest rates, do not conform to these national trends in
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Table 1
Year
The Growing Massachusetts Latino Electorate, 1982-1992
All Latino Adults Latino Registered Voters Latino Turnout
As Percentage
of All
Registered As Percentage
Voters of All Voters
19,959 0.69% 11,663 0.51%
19,000 0.62% 15,000 0.56%
19,466 0.66% 15,177 0.71%
40,965 1.30% 30,724 1.09%
48,510 1.56% 38,654 1.47%
28,000 0.86% 18,000 0.61%
1982 120,232
1984 67,000
1986 109,975
1988 142,240
1990 154,000
1992 124,000
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Voting and Registration in the Election of 1982, Current Population
Reports Series P-20, No. 383. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (hereafter USGPO), 1983;
Voting and Registration in the Election of 1984, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 405 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: USGPO, 1985); Voting and Registration in the Election of 1986, Current Population Reports Series
P-20, No. 414 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1987); Voting and Registration in the Election of 1988, Current
Population Reports Series P-20, No. 440 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1989; Voting and Registration in the
Election of 1990, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 453 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1991, Voting
and Registration in the Election of 1992, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 466 (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1993).
Figure J
Registration Rates for the Latino Electorate of
the Twelve Largest States, 1988-1992
As Percentage of Latino Voting Age Population
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
California New Mexico Florida Illinois New York Mass.
Arizona Texas Colorado New Jersey Conn. Penn.
1988 1990 1992
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-400, P20-453, and P20-466.
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Table 2
The Massachusetts Latino Electorate in 1990
Estimate 1: Estimate 2:
CPS 1990 CPS 1990
Corrected Also Corrected
with 1990 for 1990
Census Census
CPS 1990 Data3 Undercount^
154,000 180,374 193,541
(3.43%) (3.87%) (4.21%)
48,510 56,818 60,965
(1.56%) (1.77%) (1.90%)
38,654 45,274 48,579
(1.47%) (1.87%) (2.00%)
Latino Residents, 18+
(percentage of total residents)
Latino Registered Voters
(percentage of all registered voters)
Latinos Voting
(percentage of all voters)
aEstimate 1 applies the registration and voting rates reported in the 1990 CPS to the population figures in
PL94-171.
^Estimate 2 applies the same registration and voting rates to the population figures in PL94-171, adjusted
by the Census Bureau's estimate of the undercount of Latinos and the overall population.
large states. Massachusetts Latinos participated at rates comparable with Latinos nation-
wide only in the 1990 election. The large number of California Latinos compensates for
the relatively low rate of their participation; the Massachusetts Latino community is not
of that magnitude. I explore below some of the possible reasons for the lower participa-
tion of Massachusetts, but it is important to note that there is nothing Latino about low
electoral participation. In their homelands, Latinos go to the polls at much higher rates. 34
I use registration to measure participation here because registered voters, whatever
their race, vote in similar proportions. White registered voters participated at a slightly
higher rate than their Latino counterparts in the 1992 elections; compare the turnout
rates for white registered voters (90.7%) and Latino registered voters (82.5%t). The per-
centage of registered voters that did not vote in 1992 is consistent across the electorates,
from a low of 4 percent for the Asian community to a high of 7 percent in the white
electorate.
What accounts for differences in registration? Within each electorate, there is a rela-
tively consistent percentage of adults who are not registered for reasons other than citi-
zenship, from a low of 24 percent of Asians to a high of 31 percent for blacks. What
stands out are the differences in the relative sizes of the noncitizen population — 45 per-
cent of Asians and 40 percent Latinos were not citizens in 1992, compared with 5 per-
cent each of blacks and whites. For all these reasons, the overall participation profiles of
Latinos and Asians are quite similar, as are the participation portraits for the black and
Puerto Rican communities. 35
Registration Rate Differences
If registered voters of all races vote at similar rates, what accounts for the differences
in the numbers of registered voters? In particular, what accounts for the differences
between the Latino registered voters in Massachusetts and those in the other major
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states? The four factors that depress the rate are the high level of residential dispersion,
the youthfulness of the population, high poverty levels within the community, and the
high numbers of immigrants and relatively low rates of citizenship. 36 None of these fac-
tors indicate that there is anything "Latino" about nonparticipation; they point instead to
the barriers to political participation of U.S. Latinos.
Residential Patterns
Massachusetts Latinos are highly dispersed, residing primarily in white majority areas
and secondarily in multiethnic or rainbow areas. Fifty-one thousand, or 18 percent,
of Massachusetts Latinos live in three cities with a large Latino population: Chelsea,
Holyoke, and Lawrence; 41 percent live in six rainbow cities: Springfield, Boston,
Lowell, Lynn, Cambridge, and Brockton, in which there are also significant numbers of
blacks and Asians. The other 41 percent live in the rest of the state, outside these areas
of concentration. 37
To portray the residential patterns, I sorted the Massachusetts political precincts into
the following mutually exclusive categories:
• Safe 65 percent of the adult population is Latino.
• Majority 50 percent of the adult population is Latino.
• Plurality 33 percent of the adult population is Latino, and Latinos are the
largest group.
• Influence 20 percent of the adult population is Latino.
• Rainbow 10 percent of the adult population is Latino, and whites are less than
50 percent.
• Others All other precincts
It is important to distinguish between the precinct, the basic unit of politics, and the
political district, which is composed of precincts. It is possible, for example, for a La-
tino to live in a precinct categorized as other, but vote in an influence district in which
the Latino population is 20 percent or more. This categorization scheme uses precincts,
not districts, which could overstate the degree of dispersion. Even with this caution, the
high level of residential dispersion of the Latino population is evident in the data.
In 1990, almost two-thirds of Massachusetts Latinos (65%) lived in places where
Latinos comprised less than 10 percent of the population. Only 12 percent lived in
precincts in which Latinos were a majority. Approximately one in five Latinos lived
in rainbow or influence precincts.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the Latino population in six cities: Chelsea, Law-
rence, and Holyoke, with large populations of Latinos, and Springfield, Boston,
and Lowell, the rainbow cities with the highest concentration of Latinos. It is evident
from Table 3 that in the three cities where the 1 990 Latino population exceeded 30
percent, there were substantial concentrations of the Latino community. In each,
Chelsea, Lawrence, and Holyoke, districts could plausibly be created to provide political
representation. Springfield and Boston showed a few areas of concentration, but many
more rainbow or influence precincts, and Lowell had only two precincts with any Latino
concentration.
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Table 3
Distribution of Latino Population by Categorization of Precincts
in Six Large Massachusetts Cities
Safe3 Majorityb Plural Influence * Rainbowe Other^ All
Chelsea
Lawrence 4
Holyoke 1
Springfield 4
Boston
Lowell
1
9
42
1
4
14
8
47
194
33
10
30
14
64
252
35
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census Public Law 94-171, Data File, 1990.
aSafe 65% of adult population is Latino.
^Majority 50% of adult population is Latino.
cPlurality 33% of adult population is Latino, and Latinos are the largest group.
"Influence 20% of the adult population is Latino.
eRainbow 10% of the adult population is Latino, and whites are less than 50%.
'Others All other precincts.
Most U.S. Latino officials reside in safe, majority, plurality, or rainbow districts; in
Massachusetts, most Latino elected officials reside in majority districts. Representative
Merced, however, came from a rainbow district. In Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke,
Latinos are the single large minority group; in Boston, Lowell, and Springfield, they are
part of a demographic rainbow. Table 4 displays Latino population estimates for these
cities and for Massachusetts.
Table 4
Latino Political Demographics in Six Cities and State
Latino Population
Overall 8 Voting Age
(VAP)b
Voting Age
Citizens
(VAC)b
Electorate
Lawrence 41.6% 29.1% 21.2% 18.3%
Chelsea 31.4% 23.1% 16.8% 13.8%
Holyoke 31.1% 18.7% 18.6% 13.7%
Springfield 16.9% 10.9% 10.7% 7.4%
Boston 10.8% 8.4% 5.8% 4.7%
Lowell 10.2% 6.5% 5.4% 4.5%
Massachusetts House 4.8% 3.9% 2.9% 2.0%
Massachusetts Senate 4.8% 3.9% 2.9% 2.0%
a Public Law 94-171 Data File, 1990.
b Estimated for each town and state from 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics,
Report 1990, CP-2-23, 1993, Table 192. Latino citizenship for each town was estimated as follows: Holyoke
(95.7%), Springfield (94.8%), Lowell (85.2%), Lawrence (70.1%), Boston (69.0%), and Chelsea (68.9%)
cEstimated by applying statewide voting data from Voting and Registration in the Election of 1990, CPS
Report P-20, 453, 1991, to estimated Voting Age Citizens in previous column.
The Latino voting age population (VAP) is substantially smaller than its share of the
overall population, which indicates the overall youth of the Latino population as com-
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pared with other populations. Latinos represent the youngest population of all ethnic
groups in the six cities! In Holyoke, Lawrence, Lowell, and Springfield, half or almost
half of the Latino communities were below voting age. These figures were between
twice and three times the rate for the white community. The youngest Latino communi-
ties, with predominantly Puerto Rican populations, are Holyoke, Springfield, and
Lowell.
The Latino voting age citizens category estimates the citizenship rate among Latino
adults. Holyoke and Springfield, whose Latino communities are overwhelmingly Puerto
Rican, show high citizenship rates. The three cities with large Dominican or Central
American populations have much lower citizenship rates. Large numbers of Central
Americans reside in Boston and Chelsea. Many Dominicans, who are primarily located
in Lawrence and Boston, are noncitizens. Much of the 1980s Latino population growth
in Massachusetts resulted from the migration of Central Americans, whose noncitizen-
ship rate is much higher than that of Mexicans or Cubans.
Latinos generally are less likely than European immigrants to become naturalized
after five years of U.S. residence: for example, 40 percent of naturalized Mexicans wait
twenty-five years or more before naturalizing. Of those who become citizens, apparently
81 percent register to vote. 38 Noncitizenship is not unique to Mexicans: 70 percent of
Colombians, Dominicans, and Salvadorans also do not apply for naturalization once
they become eligible. 39
Poverty and Citizenship
Citizenship is highly correlated with social class. Noncitizenship is much higher among
those with less than a fifth-grade education than for those with some college. Nearly
three-quarters of Latinos with advanced degrees are citizens, compared with about one-
third of those with only a fifth-grade education.40 This is particularly true of
Massachusetts Latinos, who are believed to be the poorest of all such U.S. populations. 41
Poverty, the low Latino citizenship rate, and the vast increase in Central American
immigration in the second half of the 1980s explain the lower participation of the
Massachusetts Latino electorate in comparison with other large states.
Electoral participation is also highly correlated with social class in the United States,
which greatly affects Latino communities. One important study found that blacks voted
at higher rates than whites, and, after controlling for citizenship, age, education, and
income, that Mexican participation was comparable to the national average. 42 In other
words, the nonclass factors commonly thought to be associated with lower rates of par-
ticipation, citizenship, and age of the community turn out to be strongly correlated with
social class.
Another aspect of the influence of class is that Latinos who live outside central cities
vote at much higher rates than those who live in central cities. 43 This creates a para-
doxical situation in which Latinos vote at much lower rates in the places where they
are most highly concentrated, and at higher rates in the places of less concentration.
This also brings us to the question, What is the potential impact of alternative electoral
systems on Massachusetts Latinos?
The Impact of Alternative Electoral Systems
As previously noted, Massachusetts Latinos are a highly dispersed minority group and
face many obstacles to participation. The following discussion examines the general
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Table 5
Latino Population and Legislative Representation for
Six City Councils and Massachusetts State Legislature
Indices of
PopiNation Representatives Proportionality
As
As
Percentage
Percentage of Legislative
Total of City All Latino Chamber Additive3 Ratio b
Lawrence 29,237 41.6% 9 1 11.1% 30.5% 26.7%
Chelsea 9,018 31.4% 9 2 22.2% 09.2% 70.8%
Holyoke 13,573 31.1% 15 1 6.7% 24.4% 21.4%
Springfield 26,528 16.9% 9 0.0% 16.9% 0.0%
Boston 61,955 10.8% 13 0.0% 10.8% 0.0%
Lowell 10,499 10.2% 9 0.0% 10.2% 0.0%
Senate 287,549 4.8% 40 0.0% 4.8% 0.0%
House 160 0.0% 4.8% 0.0%
House-1990 160 1 0.6% 4.2% 12.5%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census Public Law 94-171, Data File, 1990.
aAdditive: the share (percentage) of representation is subtracted from the share of the population. This per-
centage is bounded by the Latino population of the city, with 0% as proportionate representation and a
negative number indicating underrepresentation.
^Ratio: the share of representation is divided by the share of the population. This figure generally varies
between and 100%, with the latter indicating representational equity.
claim of proportionality advocates that dispersed populations would be more highly rep-
resented under alternative voting systems, particularly in communities with many
nonvoters.
Political representation is generally measured by comparing the percentage of Latino
elected officials with the percentage of a Latino population in a given region or state.44
This definition does not require or even imply virtual representation, namely, that only a
Latino can represent Latinos. As communities of Latino voters have been increasingly
been able to vote meaningfully by choosing their own representatives, the numbers of
Latino elected officials have increased. One would have to assume that Latinos are less
likely than the overall population to vote for a Latino to expect another result.
Most Latinos are elected from the majority districts generally created in response to,
or anticipation of, voting rights suits. According to the National Association of Latino
Elected Officials, the typical Latino official's constituency is 55 percent Latino. In
Texas, which has more Latino representatives than any other state, the typical official's
constituency is 73 percent Latino! Massachusetts Latino officials have been elected from
one of two patterns: four at-large school officials in Lawrence, Chelsea, Holyoke, and
Springfield, and four district-based city councilors in Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke.
These numbers for the cities with the largest Latino concentrations are in keeping with
national trends. The gender of the Latino officials, four female school committee mem-
bers and four male city councilors, is also in keeping with national trends of females
disproportionately serving on school boards. 45
The Latino population and council representation for the six cities in the study and
the state of Massachusetts are shown in Table 5. The expectation that increased popula-
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tion produces increased political representation is generally confirmed by the data.
There is council representation in Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke, where the Latino
population exceeds 30 percent and constitutes majority precincts (see Table 3). However,
the fact that representation is higher in Chelsea than Lawrence suggests that the popula-
tion impact must be considered a tendency, not a law of politics.
Comparisons of the Latino share of the overall population with the Latino share of
council representatives indicate that Latinos, underrepresented in Chelsea, are severely
underrepresented in the other five cities. Two indexes of proportionality are usually
computed in the literature.46 The additive index subtracts the Latino population percent-
age from the representation percentage. The resulting figure varies according to the
size of the population: percent represents equitable representation, a positive percent-
age represents overrepresentation, and a negative percentage represents underrepresenta-
tion. The additive method shows Latinos to be highly underrepresented in Lawrence
(-30.5%) and Holyoke (-24.4%), where there are Latino elected officials, and less under-
represented in Boston (-10.8%), Springfield (-16.9%), or Lowell (-10.2%), where there
are none. This method is less sensitive to gains in representation in cities with a more
concentrated community. The ratio of representation to population divides the percent-
age of representation by the percentage of the population and varies from percent
for no representation to 100 percent for equitable representation and more than 100 per-
cent for overrepresentation. The ratio method shows Latinos to be most highly repre-
sented in Chelsea (70.8%). However, this method, which does not reflect population dif-
ferences in cities with no representation, classifies Springfield, Boston, and Lowell as
equally underrepresented. 47 Hence, both calculations are given here.
There are no Latino elected officials above the municipal level. Table 4 also presents
the indexes of representation for the current legislature and that of 1 990, when Nelson
Merced held office. Even when Merced was a member, the ratio for the House of
Representatives of 12.5 percent indicates that the Latino population was eight times
larger than its share of legislators. Restated, proportionate representation for the 1990
Latino population would have been eight statewide representatives.
Threshold ofRepresentation
Political scientists estimate the possible outcomes of electoral systems by calculating the
"threshold of representation," or the number of voters necessary to elect a given candi-
date. Although there are many types of proportional systems, the two most relevant are
proportional representation, which is employed in Cambridge, and cumulative voting,
which is in force in a few small U.S. locales. The calculation for this threshold, which is
consistent across the systems, is calculated as follows:
4XThreshold = 1 /(Seats + 1)
The values for this formula are given in Table 6. In a single-member district, 50 per-
cent of the voters are necessary to produce an electoral triumph in a final election.
In modified at-large systems, such as cumulative voting or proportional representation,
the threshold is calculated on the basis of the number of representatives being elected. In
an election for three at-large seats under a modified system, 25 percent of the voters
could elect a representative. Consider the case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 21 percent
Latino, which elected Inez Moncada, a Latina, to the Board of Alderman in 1987.
Cumulative voting was adopted the same year to elect the three at-large aldermen.
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Table 6
Threshold of Political Representation
Seats Voters Seats Voters
1 0.500
2 0.333
3 0.250
4 0.200
5 0.167
6 0.143
7 0.125
8 0.111
9 0.100
10 0.091
11 0.083
12 0.077
13 0.071
14 0.067
15 0.063
Source: Richard L. Engstrom, "The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote
Dilution," University of San Francisco Law Review 27 (Summer 1993).
Under this system, voters can express the strength of their preferences and cast all three
votes for one candidate or split their votes among two or three candidates. According to
analysis after Ms. Moncada's election, she received 73 percent of the Latino vote, with
Latinos casting on average 2.6 voters for her. She also received about 22 percent of the
white vote. The intensity of that Latino vote suggests the potential use of cumulative
voting by a minority.49
In Cambridge, another modified at-large system, proportional representation is used
to elect the nine members of the City Council, yielding a threshold of representation of
10.1 percent. Under this system, each voter expresses his or her preferences by ranking
the candidates. If a voter's first choice is defeated or elected with an excess of votes dur-
ing the counting, the second preference on that ballot is tallied. The process of redistrib-
uting the secondary preferences, which is why the system is also called the single trans-
ferable vote, continues until all candidates have been eliminated or elected. Thus, all
voters can exercise a preference.
Blacks, who comprised 13.5 percent of the 1990 Cambridge population, have been
able to elect a representative under this system even when their share of the population
was under the threshold. Proportional representation has also been used since 1970 in
the community school board elections in New York City. Latino and black representa-
tion on these boards has approximated the Latino and black shares of the overall popula-
tion for the twenty-plus years since. In 1983, for example, Latinos were 20 percent of
the city's population and held 17 percent of the community school board seats. New
York City Latinos were not as well represented on any other municipal or state body. 50
The Latino population (see Table 4) in each of the six study cities exceeds this
threshold of representation for the city councils if modified at-large systems had been
used. These councils vary from nine members in four of the cities to thirteen in Boston
and fifteen in Holyoke. The thresholds of representation are 10 percent for the four
cities with a council of nine, 7.1 percent in Holyoke, and 6.3 percent for Boston.
While the Latino population is larger than the thresholds for representation in these
cities, the most important indicators for the outcome of elections held under alternative
systems are the numbers of voters. The 1990 Latino electorate (see Table 4) exceeded
their thresholds of representation only in Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke, the mu-
nicipalities where Latinos were already elected through district representation. A much
closer examination of the possible impact of the alternative systems is needed.
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Table 7
Proportionate Representation for Six City Councils
and Massachusetts State Legislature
Proportionate Representation Based on
Voting Voting Current
Overall Age Age Repre-
Population 3 Population 3 Citizens*3 Electorate sentatives
Lawrence 3.7 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.0
Chelsea 2.8 2.1 1.5 1.2 2.0
Holyoke 4.7 2.8 2.8 1.2 1.0
Springfield 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0
Boston 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.0
Lowell 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.0
Massachuset ts Senate 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.6 0.0
Massachusetts House 7.7 6.2 4.7 2.4 0.0
Note: "Proportionate" legislative representation estimates the amount of representation that would be pro-
portionate to each population factor.
3 Public Law 94-171 Data File, 1990.
b 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics, Report 1990, CP-2-23, 1993.
c Voting and Registration in the Election of 1990, CPS Report P-20, 453, 1991.
Proportionate Representation
The impact of alternative systems is more thoroughly presented in Table 7, which esti-
mates proportionate council representation based on four population factors (see Table
4) and current council size if modified at-large systems were used. 51 Because of the par-
ticipation factors noted above, the estimates based on Latino voting age citizens and the
Latino electorate provide the best figures for proportionate representation. Projections
based on voting age population would be relevant for circumstances in which the voting
rights of noncitizens are under consideration. While politics would play the key role in
determining the ultimate size of the Latino electorate, the estimates of the current elec-
torate and citizens are the most accurate indicators for appraising possible outcomes.
Because of the Latino undercount by the 1990 census and continued population
growth since that time, the percentage of voting age citizens listed above may be the
best indicator of the electoral strength of the Latino communities in the various munici-
palities. In addition, an increase in participation of approximately 7 percent could be
projected by the change in electoral system. One study, which controlled for the many
cultural and idiosyncratic differences between European electoral systems, found that
the incentives for voting under systems of proportional representation resulted in a 7
percent expansion of the electorates. 52 If applied to Table 7, the estimates would slightly
exceed the column for voting age citizens. Since such an increase would bring the
Latino electorate in Massachusetts to a level commensurate with Latino electorates in
other states, such a projection seems warranted.
Table 7 suggests that Latinos would gain in virtually all the legislative bodies consid-
ered in this article. These contexts might be categorized as (1) state legislative bodies,
(2) municipal councils with Latinos elected from districts, and (3) municipal councils
without elected Latino representation.
The greatest gains from moving to modified at-large systems would occur in the state
legislature, where between three and six representatives might be elected. This creates a
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paradoxical situation in which the greatest potential gain could occur at the higher level,
which is considerably more difficult to change.
The municipal councils to which Latinos have been elected through districts offer a
more modest increase of two additional representatives. More representation would not
be expected in Chelsea, where there has been discussion of incorporating noncitizen vot-
ing to offset an otherwise anticipated possible decrease. In Lawrence and Holyoke, there
could be representational increases, dependent upon the degree of mobilization of the
electorate. The wide difference between the voting age citizens and the electorate in
Holyoke is indicative of the low voter turnout in that city. The eligible electorate of
Holyoke, the voting age citizens, would be large enough to elect three representatives
under an alternative system.
While the projected gains for Springfield, Boston, and Lowell, the three municipali-
ties without Latino elected council members, are nominal, a modified at-large system
could be expected to open access to political representation in these locales and produce
two additional representatives. These municipalities have smaller concentrations of
Latinos and significant numbers of blacks and Asians. In these three cities, it seems
highly unlikely, with the possible exception of Springfield, that there could be a Latino
municipal district for quite some time. In Lowell, however, a citywide coalition of
Latinos and Asians could elect a city councilor.
The models presented here are based on conservative figures. The Latino communi-
ties in Massachusetts, undercounted as of the 1990 census, have surely grown since that
time. Increased participation could be expected under alternative systems to levels
equivalent to the Latino electorates in other large states. Estimates based on the elec-
torate in 1995 or beyond would provide much stronger arguments for the alternative sys-
tems.
Implications
This article has explored the prospects that modified at-large electoral systems would
provide opportunities for increased political representation of the Latino communities of
Massachusetts and that gains could be anticipated in most legislative bodies, with the
greatest increase projected for the state legislature.
There are two important implications to these findings. The first is that the propor-
tionality advocates generally overstate the gains that linguistic minorities could achieve
through alternative systems. Roughly, the Latino share of an electorate is about half the
Latino share of the population. This is an important qualification of those claims.
The second implication is that the alternative systems appear incontrovertibly benefi-
cial in cities and states in which political districts cannot be drawn to represent Latinos.
Deciding which electoral system is superior in instances in which districts can be drawn
deserves a more complex discussion. However, the potential benefits for all minority
groups in multiracial cities requires further consideration, particularly given the likeli-
hood that one group's gain often comes at the expense of another's in the competition
over districts. This aspect warrants further discussion, particularly given the continued
growth of Latino and Asian populations and the strategic importance of political
alliances among minority groups for the future of our cities.
Innovative approaches to political participation are also needed. Rodolfo de la Garza
and Louis DeSipio's proposal for noncitizen voting warrants further attention within the
civil rights community and ultimately the U.S. Congress. The reliance of the alternative
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electoral structures on participating voters underscores the longer-term strategic signifi-
cance of this aspect.
The considerations to evaluate alternative electoral systems fully vastly exceed the
analysis of population presented here and must include questions about the shape of pol-
itics and the structures of government in each locale. What political alliances or coali-
tions exist or might be expected to form? How would the alternative structures affect the
relationship between representative and constituency, or the relationship between Latino
elected representatives, other elected representatives, and the overall structures of
power?
Electoral systems are not easily changed. Nonetheless, the history of the civil rights
movement has demonstrated that electoral structures can be changed. Proposals to
loosen the geographic requirement for civil rights remedies to political underrepresenta-
tion are increasingly being heard in court. In her path-breaking analysis of U.S. electoral
politics, Lani Guinier has proposed political structures that have been used successfully
in other countries with varying degrees of ethnic division. An important analyst of pub-
lic policy and ethnic disputes in the international context concluded,
What stands out, in spite of the limitations, is just how important a piece of the
incentive structure the electoral system is and what a dearth of imagination there
has been in most countries in utilizing its potential for ethnic accommodation. 53
Ultimately, there will be a need to rethink the relationship between majority rule and
minority representation, as Guinier has argued. The structure of political communities
includes not merely technical decisions, but profound expressions of how a society
approaches the inclusion of its members. This article seeks to stimulate further discus-
sion of how the United States will address its increasingly diverse electorates in the
twenty-first century.**
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